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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the information content of a large set of fiscal indicators for US real output growth and 
inflation. We provide evidence that fluctuations in certain fiscal variables contain valuable information to predict 
fluctuations in output and prices. The distinction between federal and state-local fiscal indicators yields useful insights 
and helps define a new set of stylized facts for US macroeconomic conditions. First, we find that variations in state-
local indirect taxes as well as state government surplus or deficit help predict output growth. Next, the federal 
counterparts of these indicators contain valuable information for inflation. Finally, state-local expenditures help predict 
US inflation. A set of formal and informal stability tests confirm that these relationships are stable. The fiscal indicators 
in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample performances. 
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1. Introduction  
Macroeconomic theory is paying increasing attention to fiscal policy and the interaction 
between fiscal and monetary policymaking in stabilizing inflation, employment and the real output. 
Such mechanisms and their consequences for macro-fundamentals are usually studied within 
theoretical general equilibrium models that focus on aggregate spending and taxes. However, we 
believe that some government expenditure/revenues subcomponents may be better related with 
macroeconomic variables due to certain institutional features or preferences of policymakers. In the 
literature, there is already evidence that different institutional arrangements across US states yield 
different macroeconomic outcomes at least as far as business cycle fluctuations are concerned. For 
instance, Fatás and Mihov (2006) conduct a panel-data analysis with 48 US states to study the 
variation in the cross-state level of fiscal-policy restrictions and their effect on policy and output 
volatility at the state level.  Sørensen and Yosha (2001) show that state fiscal policy has a 
stabilizing influence on output, but this influence differs across business cycles expansions and 
downturns. Such asymmetries appear to be associated with balanced budget rules or political 
conservatism that may in turn lead to constitutional balanced budget rules.  
In this paper, we take a different perspective, i.e. we look at the information value of aggregate, 
federal and state-local fiscal variables for output growth and inflation at the national level and 
provide new stylized facts for the US economy that may motivate economic theory to explore new 
transmission channels of fiscal policymaking on macroeconomic outcomes. We borrow a non-
structural, direct, statistical approach as suggested by Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Sims (1972, 
1980) and perform a systematic analysis on the informational role of a wide range of fiscal policy 
indicators to explain US inflation and real output movements. Reduced form/information value 
approach, as a preliminary test of statistical connection between certain variables, is immune to 
questions of causality, exogeneity or controllability of potential instruments.
1
 
                                                            
1
 The discretionary motive or the automatic stabilizers' role in fiscal policymaking is an important and complex topic, 
but is not the subject matter of this paper. For a recent survey of the macroeconometric literature on the identification of 
discretionary fiscal policy see for instance Caldara and Kamps (2008). 
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We find that certain fiscal indicators contain additional statistically significant information to 
explain US inflation and output growth next to the information contained in the Federal Funds rate 
and autoregressive components of inflation and real output. In particular, we find that changes in 
the federal budget, federal indirect taxes, as well as state-local expenditures contain valuable lead 
information for US inflation. Moreover, state-local budget and state-local indirect taxes are helpful 
in predicting US real output growth. Informal and formal statistical tests suggest that the 
information content present in these variables is stable over time. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is neither a theoretical explanation nor other empirical 
contribution highlighting the different information content of state-local fiscal variables as opposed 
to the federal counterparts. We conjecture that one possible determinant has to do with the different 
institutional frameworks of the federal and state-local budgets, which we document, and the timing 
at which state-local data become available. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the 
conduct of US fiscal policy in postwar years and a review of the literature on state-fiscal policy. 
Section 3 presents the dataset used in the paper. Section 4 reports Granger-style regressions based 
on inflation and real output equations that include a set of alternative fiscal indicators together with 
the Federal Funds rate. Section 5 conducts stability tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Fiscal conduct in the U.S. 
As of 2007, state-local expenditures (including transfers) account for 15 percent of US GDP, 
while federal expenditures (including transfers) have reached more than 20 percent of GDP. In 
other words, both federal and state budgets represent large shares of the US economy. Table 1 
reports the federal and state-local shares of revenue and spending components between 1955 and 
2007. A fraction of around 40 percent of total receipt and expenditures is accounted for by the state 
and local government, while the remaining part is managed at the federal level. Defense is entirely 
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guaranteed by the federal government, while the state and local government is responsible for 
almost 70 percent of investment expenditures. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Federal and state fiscal policies are intrinsically different because institutional and 
constitutional arrangements foresee a different discipline for their conduct. While federal fiscal 
policies do not face institutional restrictions other than natural democratic processes, U.S. state and 
local fiscal policies are subject to constitutional balanced budget rules.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
As Figure 1 shows, over the postwar era, the sums of state-local budgets in percentage of 
GDP have been close to balanced budget. Although across the US there are disparities in the set of 
fiscal rules that governs a state's ability to raise and spend revenue, all states but Vermont having a 
more or less stringent fiscal discipline that foresees balanced budgets (Poterba, 1996). In 1987, the 
Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) constructed an index that characterizes 
fiscal discipline among state governments and ranges from 0 (lax) to 10 (stringent). Only eight 
states received ACIR scores of 5 or below, whereas 26 received a score of 10.  
Some researchers investigated implications of these institutional arrangements, for key 
macroeconomic variables, particularly for real output, and for macroeconomic policy. Sørensen and 
Yosha (2001), for instance, use panel estimation to show that state fiscal policy has a stabilizing 
influence on output, but this influence differs across business cycles expansions and downturns. 
When state income rises, government revenue initially increases and then reverts to its initial level, 
while expenditure remains roughly constant. However, when state income falls, both revenue and 
expenditure decline with revenue remaining low for a sustained period. Such asymmetries appear to 
be associated with balanced budget rules or political conservatism (that may in turn lead to 
constitutional balanced budget rules). More precisely, the tighter the budget rules, the less effective 
is fiscal policy at stimulating the economy than it is at slowing it. On the contrary, in states with 
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relatively less strict budget rules, such as Massachusetts and New York, fiscal policy appears to 
mitigate economic slowdowns more than it mutes booms. 
Traditionally fiscal policy has received less attention than monetary policy in the 
macroeconomic literature and with some exceptions state fiscal policy has almost been neglected. 
Among others, Poterba and Rueben (1999) evaluate the effects of state-level revenue and 
expenditure limits on borrowing costs; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1990) estimate the impact of 
inflation on the real expenditures of US state-local government; and Sørensen et al. (2001) 
investigate the cyclical properties of US state-local government finances. 
In sum both federal and state budgets represent large shares of the US economy. Moreover, 
federal and state fiscal policies are intrinsically different because institutional and constitutional 
arrangements foresee a different discipline for their conduct.
2
  
  In the remainder of this paper we distinguish among a large set of aggregate, federal and 
state-local fiscal indicators and perform a systematic evaluation of their information content role on 
US output growth and inflation. 
 
3. Data 
In the following empirical analysis we use quarterly seasonally-adjusted data covering the 
period 1955:1-2007:4.
3
 We consider US macroeconomic variables, including (i) the real output, 
represented by GDP expressed in chained 2000 US dollars; (ii) the price level, represented by the 
GDP deflator; (iii) the interest rate, represented by the three-month federal funds rate (middle rate 
for each quarter); (iv) thirty-one fiscal indicators belonging to government current receipts and 
                                                            
2
 For instance, in a recent paper, Cogan and Taylor (2010) suggest that the countercyclical stimulus packages such as 
the American Economic Recovery Act (ARRA) of 2009 have had only marginal impact on real output because an 
increase in government purchases has occurred mainly at the federal level. While states and localities received 
substantial grants under ARRA, state and local governments have not increased their purchases of goods and services. 
Instead these reduced borrowing and increased transfer payments due to budget constraints at the state and local level. 
Such a large package failed to increase government consumption expenditures and infrastructure spending as many had 
predicted. 
3
 Seasonal adjustment is carried out by the source, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA conducts 
seasonal adjustment based on X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment procedures maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau, i.e. 
using the past seasonality of their source data. Hence, the issue of seasonal adjustment does not pose particular concerns 
for the Granger causality analysis presented below. 
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expenditures at the national, federal and state-local levels; (v) a set of price indices for government 
consumption expenditures and gross investment.  Most series are extracted from the database of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Federal funds rates are extracted from the database of the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors. In Appendix A, we report full descriptions and sources of all 
the series. As the detailed fiscal variables under investigation are provided in nominal terms, we 
deflate them using some price indices.
4
 Then, we compute percentage changes in the form of 
annualized log-differences.
5
 Full details on data transformations are reported in Appendix B. In the 
remainder of the paper we rely on the stationarity of all transformed series, tested by means of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests (results available on requests). 
 
4. Granger non-causality tests 
Economists often rely on non-structural autoregressive econometric models such as unrestricted 
VARs, to explain or to forecast, in a parsimonious way, variations in key macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation and output. While US output variations can typically be explained somewhat 
reliably with the use of a set of relevant variables such as Federal Funds rate and certain monetary 
aggregates next to past variations in real output itself, empirical work confronts significant 
difficulties in assigning informative variables to explain US inflation movements. Even the Federal 
Funds rate typically fails to provide statistically significant information content to explain inflation 
variations in a stable way (see for example Friedman and Kuttner (1992); Stock and Watson 
(2003)). 
In this section, we investigate the information content of fluctuations of fiscal indicators for 
output growth and inflation by means of Granger non-causality tests. By definition of Granger 
causality itself we are not looking for a proper causality relationship. Instead, we aim at detecting 
whether, in the fluctuations of some fiscal indicators, there is exploitable information that helps 
                                                            
4
 As the revenue indicators are available only in nominal terms in the BEA database we have deflated them by using 
deflators of the expenditure components. Our results are robust to the choice of CPI or GDP deflator as price deflators. 
5
 Only in the cases of government deficits or surpluses we use proper percentage changes, as they may be negative 
numbers. We also express the real output growth and the rate of inflation as annualized log-differences. For the sake of 
comparability, we also annualize the interest rate. 
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predict fluctuations in output and prices, beyond those already predictable on the basis of 
fluctuations in output and prices themselves and other promptly observable variables, such as the 
interest rate. 
Our specifications for real output changes and inflation follow closely Friedman and Kuttner 
(1992). However, while they try a number of alternative financial variables and monetary 
aggregates as a proxy of the monetary policy instrument, we simply use the short-term interest rate. 
This choice depends on the fact that we are interested in the information content of fiscal indicators 
and not in the comparative performance of alternative financial variables. 
The specification for real output changes is given by the following equation:  
Δy t =α + β iΔy t− i + λiΔpt− i
i=1
4
∑
i=1
4
∑ + δiit− i + γ iΔgt− i + ν t
i=1
4
∑
i=1
4
∑  (1) 
The terms Δy t , Δpt , it , Δgt , ν t  represent output growth, inflation, the short term interest rate, the 
change in an alternative fiscal indicator and an error term respectively. 
The inflation equation takes the following specification:  
Δpt =α + β iΔy t− i + λiΔpt− i
i=1
4
∑
i=1
4
∑ + δiit− i + γ iΔgt− i + ν t
i=1
4
∑
i=1
4
∑  (2) 
where all variables are defined as in equation (1).
6
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
We test for Granger non-causality of the fiscal indicators by imposing the null hypothesis that 
all the lags of each alternative indicator are jointly insignificant, i.e. H
0
: γ
i
= 0, ∀i =1,...,4 . In 
Table 2, we show that fluctuations in government indirect taxes (taxes on production and import) 
and in the government surplus/deficit have information content on both output growth and inflation. 
At a more disaggregated level, fluctuations in state-local indirect taxes and deficit contain useful 
information for output growth (at a 1 percent significance level); for inflation it is the federal 
                                                            
6
 We also run the tests described below using first differences of the Federal funds rate but differences in the results are 
negligible. With the exception of two cases, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test and the White test always reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedastic errors. The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange-multiplier test fails to reject the null of 
uncorrelated errors. Therefore, throughout the paper we choose to run all tests based on Wald-type chi-square statistics 
computed by taking White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Finally, the Ramsey RESET test does not 
unveil further misspecification issues. 
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analogues to be informative (at 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively). Moreover, 
contributions for government social insurance at the national and federal level and the non-defense 
component of federal expenditures help predict output growth. However, as shown in Section 5.1, 
these do not turn out to be significant in a stable way across subsamples as their significance mainly 
depends on whether or not the 1970s are included in the sample. Finally, state-local total 
expenditures, and gross investment help predict inflation at a 10 percent significance level.
7
  
Some previous studies have explored state-local finances. However, to our knowledge, there are 
no other contributions that find an information-content role for state-local expenditures on US 
inflation and state-local revenues or deficits on output growth. One possible narrative for the 
information contained in state and local expenditures for US inflation is the observation that data 
releases of state and local fiscal variables become available with a delay. In fact while the BEA 
incorporates information on federal accounts almost in real time, relying on the monthly statements 
of U.S. government receipts and outlays, which is usually published by the Treasury Department 
within a few weeks of the end of each month; for the state-local data, it typically takes more time 
for those to be collected. Hence, state and local expenditures are more likely to be initially 
estimated based on projections and revised when additional information is available. As a result, the 
Federal Reserve may incorporate imprecise information on state-local fiscal accounts when it takes 
the monetary policy decision and this may be translated in the fact that changes in the revised 
figures of state and local expenditures carry significant information content for inflation beyond that 
already contained in the Federal Funds rate. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
As a robustness check of our results, in Table 3 we take the regressions in which the fiscal 
variable results to be informative in a Granger-causal sense and add four lags of an additional fiscal 
variable. In particular, firstly we include the federal and the state-local fractions of indirect taxes 
and budget (columns I and II of the output-growth and inflation equations) to find that (i) the 
                                                            
7
 For the sake of completeness, in Appendix C, we have reported the coefficients of the lagged fiscal variables in the 
regressions where those carry information content for either output growth or inflation. However, we did not detect any 
clear-cut pattern in the significance of specific lags. 
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information content of state-local indirect taxes and budget for output growth is not wiped out by 
the inclusion of the federal counterparts; and (ii) federal indirect taxes and the federal budget carry 
valuable information for inflation also in the presence of the state-local counterparts. Secondly, we 
verify that the information content of state-local indirect taxes and the state-local budget for output 
growth is preserved also in the presence of a federal fiscal variable that was significant if included 
alone (columns III and IV of the output-growth equation). Thirdly, we confirm that state-local 
expenditures and state-local investment expenditures maintain their information value for inflation 
also when a statistically significant federal fiscal variable, such as federal indirect taxes, is included. 
We also report Granger causality tests run on the Federal funds rate. In all specifications, this is 
significant at a 1 percent level in the output growth equation and insignificant in the inflation 
equation.
8
 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
In Table 4, as a measure of comparative goodness of fit, we report the Akaike information 
criteria (AIC) of all the estimated specifications of equations (1) and (2) in ascending order. All the 
specifications in which we find information content in the fiscal variable are among the ones with 
the lowest AIC (top ten items in Table 4). According to AIC, the specifications including indirect 
taxes are the ones with the best fit.    
 
5. Stability tests 
5.1. Stability of recursive p-values 
To gain initial guidance about the stability of the Granger-causality relationships above, we plot 
the recursive p-values of the Wald tests on the joint insignificance of the lags of each alternative 
fiscal indicator. The methodology consists in computing the p-values of the Wald tests above by 
recursively changing the sample in the estimation. The resulting plots, using the alternative fiscal 
                                                            
8
 In the inflation equation, using four lags, the Federal funds rate is insignificant also in the absence of any fiscal 
variables. However, adding more lags of the interest rate (results not reported) helps retrieve significance also in the 
inflation equation. Thus, in the cases in which we find an information-content role for the fiscal variable, the latter does 
not substitute but adds further information to that already contained in past values of the interest rate. 
 9 
indicators, are depicted in figures 2 and 3. From top to bottom we report stability of p-values at: (a) 
the national government level; (b) the federal government level; and (c) the state-local government 
level.
9
 The straight horizontal line in each quadrant of figures 2 and 3 represents the 10 percent 
significance level. Thus, anything below the line represents rejection of the Granger non-causality 
null hypothesis. 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Figure 2 shows that, in the output growth equation, recursive p-values of indirect taxes are stable at 
the national level and less stable at the state-local level. For government surplus/deficit, we find that 
both at the national and the state-local level, they are statistically significant in most subsample 
though not in all of them. The p-values of the non-defense part of federal expenditures and 
contributions for government social insurance are not stable. 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Figure 3 shows that, apart from some subsamples for government deficit and state-local investment 
expenditures, the remaining recursive p-values of the fiscal components for which we find an 
information-content role for inflation are stable. 
 
5.2. Formal Stability Tests  
 To formally evaluate the stability of coefficients in the Granger-style specifications, we run 
stability tests for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the autoregressive coefficients of 
the fiscal variables. We compute three different statistics: the Quandt likelihood ratio statistic in 
Wald form (sup-Wald) as in Andrews (1993); the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) exponential 
average Wald statistic (exp-Wald); and the Andrews and Ploberger average Wald statistic (mean-
                                                            
9
 We obtain recursive p-values in three different ways: first, by fixing the endpoint (end) of the sample and making 
the starting point shift quarter by quarter from an intermediate point in the sample up to the initial observation. The first 
p-value reported refers to the sample 1980:3-2007:4; the second p-value refers to the sample 1980:2-2007:4 and so on. 
The last considered sample is the full sample 1955:1-2007:4.  Second, by fixing the starting point (str) of the sample 
and making the end point shift quarter by quarter from an intermediate point of the sample up to the last available 
observation. The first considered sample is 1955:1-1979:4. The second sample we consider is 1955:1-1980:1 and so on 
up to 1955:1-2007:4. Finally, by rolling the sample (rol), i.e. by shifting the starting point and the endpoint of the 
sample quarter by quarter. Hence the initial sample is 1955:1-1979:4, the second sample is 1955:2-1980:1 and so on up 
to 1980:3-2007:4. 
 
 10 
Wald). We apply a 15 percent symmetric sample trimming, which allows us to check whether a 
breakpoint has occurred in the interval 1963:1-1998:4. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
Table 5 displays the results of the tests. They fail to reject the null hypothesis of parameter 
constancy in all cases.
10
 
 
5.3. Out-of-sample Analysis 
To evaluate the out-of-sample performances of the estimated equations, we use recursive least 
squares. For each equation specification, we compute all feasible cases, starting from the smallest 
possible sample size and adding one observation at a time. At each step, we save the one-step ahead 
forecast error to obtain a series of recursive residuals. We then use each series of recursive residuals 
to compute the correspondent root mean squared errors (RMSE), which we report in Table 6 in 
ascending order. 
 <Insert Table 6 here> 
A relatively low RMSE can be interpreted as a further indicator of stability of the specification in 
question in comparative terms. The ordering obtained in Table 6 is virtually coincident to the 
ordering implied by AIC in Table 4. The specifications where fiscal variables have stable 
information content for output growth or inflation are also the ones with the best out-of-sample 
performances. Indirect taxes yield the lowest RMSE both in the output growth and in the inflation 
equation.   
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
We provide evidence that fluctuations in certain fiscal variables contain valuable information to 
predict fluctuations in output and prices. Our analysis also shows that the distinction between 
federal and state-local fiscal indicators provides useful insights. 
                                                            
10
 The approximate asymptotic p-values are provided by Hansen (1997). 
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First, we find that variations in state-local indirect taxes as well as state government surplus or 
deficit help predict output growth. Next, the federal counterparts of these indicators contain 
valuable information for inflation. Finally, state-local expenditures help predict US inflation. 
A set of formal and informal stability tests confirm that these relationships are stable. The fiscal 
indicators in questions are also among the ones that yield the best in-sample and out-of-sample 
performances. 
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Appendix A. Data sources and description 
Variables Measurement unit Type Freq. Sample Source 
Gross domestic product  Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5 
Real Gross Domestic Product Billions of 2000 dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.6 
Implicit GDP deflator Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.9 
Three-month federal funds rate Percentage MR Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 Federal Reserve Board 
        
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:       
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.1 
        
Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:       
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Contributions for government social insurance Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
Federal defense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5 
Federal nondefense expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5 
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.2 
        
State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:        
Total receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Current tax receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Personal current taxes Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Taxes on production and imports Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Taxes on corporate income Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Current transfer receipts Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Total expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Current expenditures Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Gross government investment Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
Net lending or net borrowing (-) Billions of current dollars SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.3 
        
Price Indices for Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment:      
Government expenditures  Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Government consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Government gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Federal expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Federal consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Federal gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
National defense Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
Federal nondefense expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
State and local expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
State and local consumption expenditures Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
State and local gross investment Index numbers 2000=100 SA Q.ly 1955:1-2007:4 BEA NIPA Table 3.9.4 
SA = seasonally adjusted; MR = middle rate; Q.ly = quarterly;        
BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis; NIPA = National Income and Product Accounts     
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Appendix B. Data transformations 
Keywords Variables Transformations 
gdp Real GDP growth rate Annualized log-difference in real GDP 
inf Inflation rate Annualized log-difference of the Implicit GDP deflator 
int Interest rate Annualized three-month Federal funds rate 
 Government Current Receipts and Expenditures: 
gov.cur.tax Current tax receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.per.tax Personal current taxes Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.pro.tax Taxes on production and imports Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.cor.tax Taxes on corporate income Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.soc.con Contributions for government social insurance Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.tot.exp Total expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
gov.cur.exp Current expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using government consumption expenditures price index) 
gov.inv.exp Gross government investment Annualized log-difference (deflated using government gross investment expenditures price index) 
gov.sur.def Net lending or net borrowing (-) Annualized growth rate (deflated using government expenditures price index) 
 Federal Government Current Receipts and Expenditures: 
fed.tot.rec Total receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.cur.tax Current tax receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.per.tax Personal current taxes Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.pro.tax Taxes on production and imports Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.cor.tax Taxes on corporate income Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.soc.con Contributions for government social insurance Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.tot.exp Total expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
fed.cur.exp Current expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal consumption expenditures price index) 
fed.inv.exp Gross government investment Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal gross investment expenditures price index) 
fed.def.exp Federal defense expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using national defense expenditures price index) 
fed.non.exp Federal nondefense expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using federal nondefense expenditures price index) 
fed.sur.def Net lending or net borrowing (-) Annualized growth rate (deflated using federal expenditures price index) 
 State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures:  
stl.tot.rec Total receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.cur.tax Current tax receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.per.tax. Personal current taxes Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.pro.tax Taxes on production and imports Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.cor.tax Taxes on corporate income Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.cur.tra Current transfer receipts Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.tot.exp Total expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
stl.cur.exp Current expenditures Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local consumption expenditures price index) 
stl.inv.exp. Gross government investment Annualized log-difference (deflated using state and local investment expenditures price index) 
stl.sur.def Net lending or net borrowing (-) Annualized growth rate (deflated using state and local expenditures price index) 
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Appendix C.  Coefficients on lagged fiscal variables. Selected regressions. 
Fiscal  
variables 
Output growth equation Fiscal  
variables 
Inflation equation 
Δg
t−1
 Δg
t−2
 Δg
t−3
 Δg
t−4
 Δg
t−1
 Δg
t−2
 Δg
t−3
 Δg
t−4
 
gov.pro.tax 0.1003 0.1644 -0.0645 -0.1113 gov.pro.tax 0.0333 0.0170 -0.0644 -0.0308 
  (0.1318) (0.0131) (0.2760) (0.0391)   (0.1576) (0.4756) (0.0010) (0.1561) 
gov.soc.con -0.0235 -0.0523 -0.0461 -0.0248 gov.sur.def 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
  (0.4085) (0.0041) (0.0411) (0.3890)   (0.0536) (0.3076) (0.0053) (0.0132) 
gov.sur.def -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0004 0.0006 fed.pro.tax 0.0086 0.0051 -0.0084 -0.0121 
  (0.7617) (0.0017) (0.4377) (0.1915)   (0.0932) (0.4404) (0.1308) (0.0117) 
fed.soc.con -0.0204 -0.0520 -0.0444 -0.0254 fed.sur.def -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
  (0.4483) (0.0022) (0.0369) (0.3566)   (0.0286) (0.7859) (0.0720) (0.9517) 
fed.non.exp -0.0161 0.0200 0.0385 0.0113 stl.tot.exp -0.0474 -0.0236 0.0304 0.0285 
  (0.3253) (0.1878) (0.0168) (0.4276)   (0.0492) (0.2389) (0.0836) (0.1651) 
stl.pro.tax 0.1326 0.1957 -0.0147 -0.1720 stl.inv.exp -0.0107 -0.0023 0.0101 0.0069 
  (0.0675) (0.0153) (0.8560) (0.0181)   (0.1553) (0.7322) (0.0804) (0.2733) 
stl.sur.def -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.0003       
  (0.0002) (0.5255) (0.0092) (0.3331)           
 
Note: p-values in parentheses. 
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Table 1. Federal and state-local shares of revenue and spending components  
Fiscal variables Federal Government State and Local Government 
   
 
(Percentages of total values  
Sample: 1955-2007) 
   
Total receipts 58.4 41.6 
Current tax receipts 57.0 43.0 
Personal current taxes 81.0 19.0 
Taxes on production and imports 15.3 84.7 
Taxes on corporate income 86.1 13.9 
Contributions for government social insurance 100.0 0.0 
Current transfer receipts 0.0 100.0 
   
Total expenditures 60.1 39.9 
Current expenditures 62.5 37.5 
Gross government investment 32.1 67.9 
Federal defense expenditures 100.0 0.0 
Federal nondefense expenditures 100.0 0.0 
Net lending or net borrowing (-) 81.6 18.4 
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Table 2. Granger non-causality tests 
Fiscal  
variables 
Output growth equation Inflation equation 
Fiscal variables Federal funds rate Fiscal variables Federal funds rate 
χ-square p-values χ-square p-values χ-square p-values χ-square p-values 
gov.cur.tax 3.5462 (0.4709) 19.0550 (0.0008) 2.1616 (0.7061) 1.4633 (0.8331) 
gov.per.tax 3.0623 (0.5475) 18.4839 (0.0010) 2.0391 (0.7286) 1.4795 (0.8303) 
gov.pro.tax 14.9401 (0.0048) 23.0491 (0.0001) 20.5659 (0.0004) 1.7041 (0.7900) 
gov.cor.tax 1.8696 (0.7597) 17.5770 (0.0015) 5.5539 (0.2350) 1.7759 (0.7769) 
gov.soc.con 10.4189 (0.0339) 15.3063 (0.0041) 2.1430 (0.7095) 1.3928 (0.8454) 
gov.tot.exp 0.1661 (0.9967) 15.5148 (0.0037) 1.9437 (0.7461) 0.9218 (0.9214) 
gov.cur.exp 3.8270 (0.4299) 18.5037 (0.0010) 4.3615 (0.3593) 1.3653 (0.8502) 
gov.inv.exp 6.7417 (0.1502) 19.1063 (0.0007) 6.1831 (0.1859) 1.4585 (0.8340) 
gov.sur.def 11.6294 (0.0203) 19.4145 (0.0007) 29.7478 (0.0000) 1.3872 (0.8464) 
fed.tot.rec 2.7049 (0.6084) 15.7454 (0.0034) 1.9299 (0.7486) 1.3772 (0.8481) 
fed.cur.tax 2.3115 (0.6787) 17.8673 (0.0013) 1.7567 (0.7804) 1.3025 (0.8609) 
fed.per.tax 3.0183 (0.5548) 18.1214 (0.0012) 0.8239 (0.9352) 1.4074 (0.8429) 
fed.pro.tax 6.1482 (0.1883) 20.1472 (0.0005) 17.4563 (0.0016) 1.4264 (0.8396) 
fed.cor.tax 2.2163 (0.6960) 18.1791 (0.0011) 5.5229 (0.2377) 1.7569 (0.7804) 
fed.soc.con 11.9526 (0.0177) 14.0641 (0.0071) 3.2944 (0.5098) 1.5173 (0.8236) 
fed.tot.exp 0.6503 (0.9573) 15.7254 (0.0034) 4.4439 (0.3493) 1.3198 (0.8580) 
fed.cur.exp 2.7462 (0.6011) 17.5932 (0.0015) 5.0941 (0.2778) 1.4917 (0.8281) 
fed.inv.exp 2.1053 (0.7164) 18.0301 (0.0012) 7.3973 (0.1163) 1.4480 (0.8358) 
fed.def.exp 2.8284 (0.5869) 16.6178 (0.0023) 4.4005 (0.3545) 1.3658 (0.8501) 
fed.non.exp 8.3429 (0.0798) 15.2296 (0.0042) 0.8795 (0.9275) 1.4301 (0.8390) 
fed.sur.def 2.4737 (0.6494) 15.8904 (0.0032) 10.0731 (0.0392) 1.6371 (0.8021) 
stl.tot.rec 7.6172 (0.1066) 14.2508 (0.0065) 7.2555 (0.1230) 1.6687 (0.7964) 
stl.cur.tax 6.7594 (0.1492) 16.6685 (0.0022) 5.8524 (0.2104) 1.4378 (0.8376) 
stl.per.tax. 4.8029 (0.3081) 16.8764 (0.0020) 6.4619 (0.1672) 1.5752 (0.8133) 
stl.pro.tax 17.6625 (0.0014) 15.8133 (0.0033) 7.1507 (0.1281) 1.2723 (0.8661) 
stl.cor.tax 5.3520 (0.2530) 17.0132 (0.0019) 3.2190 (0.5219) 1.4893 (0.8285) 
stl.cur.tra 0.5540 (0.9680) 16.0980 (0.0029) 4.2655 (0.3713) 1.6877 (0.7930) 
stl.tot.exp 1.8923 (0.7556) 17.3636 (0.0016) 7.8744 (0.0963) 1.6760 (0.7951) 
stl.cur.exp 1.2100 (0.8765) 17.3008 (0.0017) 1.3549 (0.8520) 1.4468 (0.8360) 
stl.inv.exp. 7.3464 (0.1187) 16.8990 (0.0020) 8.8755 (0.0643) 1.7774 (0.7766) 
stl.sur.def 29.7698 (0.0000) 16.3544 (0.0026) 7.6090 (0.1070) 1.2648 (0.8673) 
 
Note:  Wald-type chi-square statistics computed by taking White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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Table 3. Granger non-causality tests for selected fiscal variables in the presence of two 
fiscal variables.  
 
Fiscal  
variables 
Output growth equation Inflation equation 
I II III IV I II III IV 
fed.non.exp   6.3609 7.4373     
    (0.1738) (0.1145)     
           
fed.pro.tax 8.4711     18.0225  14.7476 14.6768 
  (0.0758)     (0.0012)  (0.0053) (0.0054) 
fed.sur.def  3.1131     9.4621   
   (0.5391)     (0.0505)   
stl.pro.tax 20.3336  14.8092   6.5878    
  (0.0004)  (0.0051)   (0.1593)    
stl.tot.exp        8.1610  
         (0.0859)  
stl.inv.exp         9.3521 
          (0.0529) 
stl.sur.def  32.4127  23.9819  10.3410   
    (0.0000)   (0.0001)   (0.0351)     
 
Note:  Wald-type chi-square statistics computed by taking White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Regressions specified as in equations (1) and (2) plus 4 lags of an additional fiscal variable. Null hypothesis: 4 lags 
of each fiscal variable are jointly zero in the presence of 4 lags of the additional fiscal variable. P-values in 
parentheses.  
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Table 4. Akaike information criteria (AIC) 
Output growth equation Inflation equation 
AIC Fiscal variable AIC Fiscal variable AIC Fiscal variable AIC Fiscal variable 
5.2164 gov.pro.tax 5.2732 stl.cor.tax 3.1024 gov.pro.tax 3.1529 gov.cor.tax 
5.2260 stl.pro.tax 5.2772 gov.cur.tax 3.1126 fed.pro.tax 3.1541 stl.sur.def 
5.2266 fed.non.exp 5.2786 fed.def.exp 3.1129 gov.sur.def 3.1546 stl.tot.rec 
5.2370 fed.soc.con 5.2793 fed.inv.exp 3.1315 fed.sur.def 3.1556 fed.soc.con 
5.2420 gov.soc.con 5.2811 fed.sur.def 3.1319 stl.pro.tax 3.1588 stl.cur.tra 
5.2424 stl.sur.def 5.2814 stl.tot.exp 3.1339 fed.cur.exp 3.1629 gov.tot.exp 
5.2480 gov.sur.def 5.2816 fed.cur.tax 3.1343 fed.inv.exp 3.1634 gov.soc.con 
5.2525 stl.inv.exp. 5.2824 fed.per.tax 3.1363 stl.inv.exp. 3.1646 stl.cor.tax 
5.2558 stl.tot.rec 5.2827 gov.per.tax 3.1381 stl.tot.exp 3.1663 gov.per.tax 
5.2583 fed.pro.tax 5.2832 fed.cor.tax 3.1382 fed.tot.exp 3.1669 gov.cur.tax 
5.2605 stl.cur.tax 5.2851 gov.cor.tax 3.1412 gov.cur.exp 3.1677 fed.tot.rec 
5.2626 gov.inv.exp 5.2862 stl.cur.exp 3.1425 stl.cur.tax 3.1699 fed.cur.tax 
5.2659 gov.cur.exp 5.2873 fed.tot.exp 3.1429 gov.inv.exp 3.1724 stl.cur.exp 
5.2715 stl.per.tax. 5.2878 stl.cur.tra 3.1447 stl.per.tax. 3.1725 fed.non.exp 
5.2716 fed.cur.exp 5.2904 gov.tot.exp 3.1500 fed.cor.tax 3.1727 fed.per.tax 
5.2723 fed.tot.rec     3.1514 fed.def.exp     
 
 20 
Table 5. Tests for structural breaks 
Fiscal  
variables 
Output growth equation Inflation equation 
sup-
Wald p-values 
exp-
Wald p-values 
mean-
Wald p-values 
sup-
Wald p-values 
exp-
Wald p-values 
mean-
Wald p-values 
gov.cur.tax 3.4857 (0.9949) 0.8313 (0.9893) 1.6046 (0.9743) 2.0068 (1.0000) 0.4355 (1.0000) 0.8182 (1.0000) 
gov.per.tax 6.2488 (0.8163) 0.7653 (0.9959) 1.1998 (0.9998) 2.1585 (1.0000) 0.4797 (1.0000) 0.9192 (1.0000) 
gov.pro.tax 3.6859 (0.9913) 0.6293 (1.0000) 1.1685 (1.0000) 2.1380 (1.0000) 0.3874 (1.0000) 0.7272 (1.0000) 
gov.cor.tax 3.9246 (0.9854) 1.1305 (0.9264) 2.0496 (0.8976) 3.9605 (0.9844) 0.9977 (0.9602) 1.6846 (0.9638) 
gov.soc.con 2.9049 (0.9995) 0.4370 (1.0000) 0.8135 (1.0000) 3.2725 (0.9974) 0.9894 (0.9621) 1.7891 (0.9477) 
gov.tot.exp 4.6004 (0.9571) 1.1852 (0.9103) 1.9160 (0.9249) 9.2532 (0.4563) 1.8696 (0.6615) 1.3541 (0.9956) 
gov.cur.exp 6.7665 (0.7569) 1.4605 (0.8167) 2.0970 (0.8872) 6.7172 (0.7627) 1.2083 (0.9032) 1.2773 (0.9985) 
gov.inv.exp 3.2391 (0.9977) 0.6918 (0.9995) 1.2691 (0.9987) 1.7932 (1.0000) 0.5309 (1.0000) 1.0441 (1.0000) 
gov.sur.def 3.2011 (0.9980) 0.8185 (0.9908) 1.5689 (0.9784) 1.8732 (1.0000) 0.5818 (1.0000) 1.1377 (1.0000) 
fed.tot.rec 2.9396 (0.9994) 0.8770 (0.9830) 1.6759 (0.9650) 1.8589 (1.0000) 0.4965 (1.0000) 0.9580 (1.0000) 
fed.cur.tax 3.8175 (0.9883) 0.9805 (0.9640) 1.8820 (0.9313) 1.9801 (1.0000) 0.4813 (1.0000) 0.9186 (1.0000) 
fed.per.tax 6.7575 (0.7579) 0.8831 (0.9821) 1.3377 (0.9964) 2.3799 (1.0000) 0.5696 (1.0000) 1.0754 (1.0000) 
fed.pro.tax 3.2919 (0.9972) 0.9468 (0.9709) 1.7714 (0.9506) 2.9089 (0.9995) 0.5796 (1.0000) 1.0213 (1.0000) 
fed.cor.tax 4.9948 (0.9321) 1.4144 (0.8335) 2.5471 (0.7764) 4.2364 (0.9746) 1.0575 (0.9460) 1.7772 (0.9497) 
fed.soc.con 1.7895 (1.0000) 0.3882 (1.0000) 0.7444 (1.0000) 4.4583 (0.9645) 1.1141 (0.9310) 1.8468 (0.9377) 
fed.tot.exp 5.4252 (0.8980) 1.3873 (0.8431) 2.1949 (0.8648) 5.9551 (0.8476) 1.0870 (0.9384) 1.3764 (0.9945) 
fed.cur.exp 4.4282 (0.9660) 1.0324 (0.9522) 1.7572 (0.9529) 6.6859 (0.7664) 1.2330 (0.8954) 1.2821 (0.9984) 
fed.inv.exp 4.3572 (0.9693) 0.8000 (0.9928) 1.4212 (0.9917) 2.5260 (1.0000) 0.5754 (1.0000) 1.0984 (1.0000) 
fed.def.exp 1.3084 (1.0000) 0.3354 (1.0000) 0.6496 (1.0000) 2.6108 (1.0000) 0.6329 (1.0000) 1.1891 (0.9999) 
fed.non.exp 5.7323 (0.8698) 1.3001 (0.8734) 2.0469 (0.8982) 5.3024 (0.9084) 1.5980 (0.7652) 2.6954 (0.7371) 
fed.sur.def 5.2423 (0.9133) 1.6000 (0.7644) 3.0506 (0.6424) 3.9108 (0.9858) 1.5412 (0.7867) 2.9150 (0.6784) 
stl.tot.rec 7.3565 (0.6850) 1.8982 (0.6507) 2.4108 (0.8117) 2.8370 (0.9997) 0.6660 (0.9999) 1.1650 (1.0000) 
stl.cur.tax 11.3773 (0.2562) 2.8785 (0.3364) 3.0954 (0.6306) 2.4432 (1.0000) 0.6453 (1.0000) 1.2460 (0.9992) 
stl.per.tax. 1.1555 (1.0000) 0.2440 (1.0000) 0.4732 (1.0000) 1.4235 (1.0000) 0.4413 (1.0000) 0.8608 (1.0000) 
stl.pro.tax 3.7543 (0.9898) 0.7135 (0.9989) 1.3026 (0.9978) 1.2685 (1.0000) 0.2859 (1.0000) 0.5498 (1.0000) 
stl.cor.tax 3.5535 (0.9938) 0.6951 (0.9995) 1.2068 (0.9998) 2.1726 (1.0000) 0.5280 (1.0000) 0.9489 (1.0000) 
stl.cur.tra 4.0669 (0.9809) 1.1044 (0.9337) 2.1496 (0.8753) 2.5392 (1.0000) 0.6009 (1.0000) 1.1094 (1.0000) 
stl.tot.exp 3.2288 (0.9978) 0.6450 (1.0000) 1.1940 (0.9999) 4.3080 (0.9715) 0.8107 (0.9917) 1.3322 (0.9966) 
stl.cur.exp 2.1365 (1.0000) 0.4470 (1.0000) 0.8506 (1.0000) 1.1580 (1.0000) 0.3278 (1.0000) 0.6441 (1.0000) 
stl.inv.exp. 2.9690 (0.9993) 0.4454 (1.0000) 0.7940 (1.0000) 3.2065 (0.9980) 0.9298 (0.9741) 1.6834 (0.9640) 
stl.sur.def 4.4729 (0.9638) 1.1119 (0.9316) 1.8026 (0.9454) 3.4985 (0.9947) 0.7313 (0.9981) 1.3772 (0.9944) 
15 percent symmetric trimming; Test sample: 1963:1-1998:4;  Null hypothesis: no structural breaks in the fiscal variables;  
Hansen (1997) asymptotic p-values. 
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Table 6. Root mean squared errors of recursive residuals (RMSE) 
Output growth equation Inflation equation 
RMSE Fiscal variable RMSE Fiscal variable RMSE Fiscal variable RMSE Fiscal variable 
3.1586 gov.pro.tax 3.2498 stl.cor.tax 1.0977 gov.pro.tax 1.1257 gov.cor.tax 
3.1740 stl.pro.tax 3.2563 gov.cur.tax 1.1032 fed.pro.tax 1.1264 stl.sur.def 
3.1748 fed.non.exp 3.2585 fed.def.exp 1.1034 gov.sur.def 1.1266 stl.tot.rec 
3.1913 fed.soc.con 3.2597 fed.inv.exp 1.1137 fed.sur.def 1.1272 fed.soc.con 
3.1994 gov.soc.con 3.2625 fed.sur.def 1.1139 stl.pro.tax 1.1290 stl.cur.tra 
3.2000 stl.sur.def 3.2631 stl.tot.exp 1.1150 fed.cur.exp 1.1314 gov.tot.exp 
3.2090 gov.sur.def 3.2634 fed.cur.tax 1.1153 fed.inv.exp 1.1317 gov.soc.con 
3.2163 stl.inv.exp. 3.2646 fed.per.tax 1.1164 stl.inv.exp. 1.1323 stl.cor.tax 
3.2216 stl.tot.rec 3.2653 gov.per.tax 1.1174 stl.tot.exp 1.1333 gov.per.tax 
3.2255 fed.pro.tax 3.2659 fed.cor.tax 1.1175 fed.tot.exp 1.1336 gov.cur.tax 
3.2291 stl.cur.tax 3.2691 gov.cor.tax 1.1191 gov.cur.exp 1.1341 fed.tot.rec 
3.2325 gov.inv.exp 3.2709 stl.cur.exp 1.1199 stl.cur.tax 1.1353 fed.cur.tax 
3.2378 gov.cur.exp 3.2727 fed.tot.exp 1.1201 gov.inv.exp 1.1367 stl.cur.exp 
3.2470 stl.per.tax. 3.2735 stl.cur.tra 1.1211 stl.per.tax. 1.1368 fed.non.exp 
3.2471 fed.cur.exp 3.2778 gov.tot.exp 1.1241 fed.cor.tax 1.1369 fed.per.tax 
3.2483 fed.tot.rec     1.1249 fed.def.exp     
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Figure 1. US government surplus as fractions of GDP  
(Source: our computations using BEA data) 
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Figure 2. Recursive p-values of Granger non-causality tests 
on fiscal indicators in the output growth equation 
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(a) Government current receipt and expenditures. 
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(b) Federal government current receipts and expenditures. 
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(c) State-local government current receipts and expenditures. 
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Figure 3. Recursive p-values of Granger non-causality tests  
on fiscal indicators in the inflation equation 
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(a) Government current receipt and expenditures. 
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(b) Federal government current receipts and expenditures. 
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(c) State-local government current receipts and expenditures. 
 
 
